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MACRA AND MEDICARE’S ELUSIVE QUEST FOR FAIRNESS AND 
VALUE WITH PHYSICIAN PAYMENT POLICY: SPEEDING UP THE 
TRANSITION TO “BIG MED” 
RICK MAYES* AND SOLEIL SHAH** 
ABSTRACT 
This article traces the evolution of Medicare physician payment policy from 
the program’s beginning to the passage of the 2015 Medicare Access and CHIP 
Reauthorization Act (MACRA). Based on interviews, primary data sources, and 
an extensive review of the secondary literature, the authors provide an analysis 
of: (1) some of the most significant events, trends and factors that led to the Act’s 
passage, (2) MACRA’s basic design and the primary options it gives to 
physicians, and (3) the major concerns many physician representatives and 
health policy experts have about MACRA. As the majority of physicians will 
likely feel the need to join big medical groups in response to MACRA’s set of 
penalties and incentives, the authors conclude that MACRA essentially amounts 
to a massive gamble on the ability of large health care organizations and pay-
for-performance schemes to improve the quality of patient care and restrain the 
overall rate of Medicare cost growth. MACRA’s contribution to the trend of 
increased vertical integration—physicians’ alignment with and employment in 
big health care systems that provide an entire continuum of care—raises 
concerns noted by many experts over: increased health care prices and total 
costs, excessive use of medical services, patients’ access to physicians, overall 
physician autonomy and morale, and decreased competition with the potential 
for monopolistic or oligopolistic exploitation of market share by larger and 
larger health care systems. 
 
* Rick Mayes, Ph.D., Professor and Co-Chair, Healthcare Studies at the University of Richmond 
(Richmond, VA). 
** Analyst at the Advisory Board Company (Washington, D.C.). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Part of President Lyndon Johnson’s original political deal with the American 
Medical Association that helped create Medicare in 1965 was for the program 
to pay physicians based on their own charges, rather than on a standardized fee 
schedule created by health insurers or the government.1 At the time, Aetna was 
using what in private insurance language was called “usual, customary, and 
reasonable” (UCR) reimbursement.2 Under this approach, payments made to 
physicians were based on the regular, “usual” charge of the physician, assuming 
the charge to be within the range of “customary” fees in that geographic area for 
the same service, or if precedent was lacking, to be “reasonable.”3 With patients 
no longer having to pay out of pocket (their Aetna plans paying instead), the 
UCR payment system was a bonanza for physicians who repeatedly raised their 
usual charges. Also, “[b]ecause payments were based on historical charges,” 
notes John Iglehart, “there were wide discrepancies in payments to primary care 
physicians and specialists and to providers who practiced in different geographic 
areas.”4 
Medicare’s leaders instructed the program’s administrative intermediary, 
Blue Shield, to adopt Aetna’s method of UCR.5 When Medicare began operation 
in 1966, the terminology changed slightly with “prevailing,” replacing 
“customary,” and UCR charges became “customary, prevailing and reasonable” 
(CPR) charges.6 CPR payment quickly proved inflationary. From 1970 through 
the 1980s, the average annual growth rate of Medicare’s spending on physician 
services was 10.6%.7 By “the late 1980s, Medicare’s physician expenditures 
were growing at more than double the rate of its hospital expenditures.”8 “This 
divergence in” cost growth “was partly driven by the … incentives” at the time 
under Medicare’s new hospital reimbursement model (diagnosis-related groups, 
or DRGs), “which pushed more and more medical services out of inpatient 
 
 1. See Steven Findlay, Health Policy Brief: Medicare’s New Physician Payment System, 
HEALTH AFF. 1 (2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20160421.151319/full/ 
healthpolicybrief_156.pdf. 
 2. Thomas L. Delbanco et al., Paying the Physician’s Fee — Blue Shield and the Reasonable 
Charge, 301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1314, 1315 (1979). 
 3. See Benson B. Roe, The UCR Boondoggle — A Death Knell for Private Practice?, 305 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 41, 41 (1981). 
 4. John K. Iglehart, Medicare’s Declining Payments to Physicians, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1924, 1924 (2002). 
 5. Delbanco et al., supra note 2, at 1316. 
 6. Id. 
 7. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REV. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 17 (1992). 
 8. RICK MAYES & ROBERT A. BERENSON, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE 
SHAPING OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 83 (2006). 
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hospital settings and into ambulatory settings, including physician offices.”9 “By 
1989, Medicare’s Part B spending—most of which was for physician services—
had become the single largest domestic program financed from general reve-
nues.”10 As a result, elected officials and policymakers began looking for an 
alternative payment system. 
In designing a new system to try to control the rate of cost growth, policy 
makers also focused on trying to make Medicare’s payment policy more fair.11 
“Under the CPR system, some services were reimbursed much more 
generously” relative to their costs than other services.12 William Hsiao, a 
Harvard University health services researcher, had been studying physician 
competition under a government contract in the late 1970s, when his research 
took a detour that proved enormously consequential.13 “Most of the physicians 
I interviewed,” Hsiao said, “told me that the prices of physicians’ services were 
unfair.”14 He found that the value of surgical procedures was overstated by as 
much as four- to five-fold when compared to the value of a basic office visit.15 
Procedures that had become routine or automated as a result of advances in 
technology were especially profitable, because the rates that had been previously 
established were never adjusted downward when they became less costly and 
easier to perform.16 As Robert Berenson has explained, economists refer to these 
as “downward sticky” prices.17 “Over time, Medicare’s CPR method for 
reimbursement … effectively ratified” and entrenched these payment 
distortions.18 
 
 9. Id.; Interview with Stuart Altman, Economist and Professor, Nat’l Health Policy, Brandeis 
Univ. (July 22, 2002); Kathleen Carey, Cost Allocation Patterns between Hospital Inpatient and 
Outpatient Departments, 29 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 275, 275–76 (1994). 
 10. MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 8, at 83; Joseph P. Newhouse, Medicare Policy in the 
1990s 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8531, 2001). 
 11. MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 8, at 83. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Rick Mayes, The Origins, Development, and Passage of Medicare’s Revolutionary 
Prospective Payment System, J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI., Jan. 2007, at 21, 24. 
 14. Telephone Interview by Rick Mayes with William Hsiao, K.T. Li Research Professor of 
Economics, Harvard Univ. (Oct. 22, 2002) (on file with author); Telephone Interview by Richard 
Shuster with William Hsiao, Acting Chief Actuary for Medical Programs under the Nixon 
Administration, Social Security Admin. (Aug. 23, 1995). 
 15. See William Hsiao & William Stason, Toward Developing a Relative Value Scale for 
Medical and Surgical Services, 1 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 23, 23 (1979). 
 16. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REIMBURSEMENT UNDER MEDICARE: OPTIONS FOR 
CHANGE 31 (1986). 
 17. “Downward sticky” means that prices should go down due to increased efficiency or a 
reduction in input costs, but that they don’t because physicians and the system in which they operate 
resist it. Robert A. Berenson & John D. Goodson, Finding Value in Unexpected Places — Fixing 
the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1306, 1307 (2016). 
 18. MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 8, at 85. 
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Based on his team’s research, Hsiao concluded that a physician’s work “was 
a function of time spent, mental effort and judgment, technical skill and physical 
effort, and stress.”19 Congress attempted to translate Hsiao’s research into policy 
by creating the Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC).20 The PPRC’s 
mission was to provide technical advice for Congress on transforming the 
conceptual product of Hsiao’s research into a new physician payment system for 
Medicare.21 
Building on Hsiao’s work and adding other sources of data from specialty 
societies and Medicare administrative charge data, the PPRC ultimately 
submitted a set of recommendations to Congress in 1989.22 First, it called for a 
relative-value scale that would raise reimbursement rates to some physicians and 
lower them to others by basing physician payments on the resources—work, 
time, and costs—required to provide them.23 It became known as the Resource-
Based Relative-Value Scale (RBRVS).24 “The RBRVS was trying to mimic the 
competitive market, in which the cost of a product should come very close to the 
cost for producing that product,” according to Hsiao.25 The PPRC’s second 
recommendation was to institute limits or a mechanism that would “restrain the 
overall growth rate of Medicare’s physician expenditures.”26 “If total Medicare 
spending on physician services exceeded this target in one year, payment rates 
would be adjusted downward the following year.27 Policy makers called this 
mechanism the Volume Performance Standard (VPS).”28 Physicians hated the 
expenditure targets and VPS, comparing them to “rationing.”29 
Congress incorporated the PPRC’s recommendations into a budget 
reconciliation bill and “passed the new Medicare Physician Fee Schedule—
together with annual expenditure targets—as the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 
1989.”30 When the new system finally began operation in 1992, it quickly had a 
noticeable impact. Annual growth in the volume and intensity of Medicare 
physician services in the first two years of the new reimbursement system were 
 
 19. Atul Gawande, Piecework: Medicine’s Money Problem, NEW YORKER, Apr. 4, 2005, at 
44. 
 20. Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. § 9305 (2000). 
 21. For the best summary and analysis of the PPRC, see Thomas R. Oliver, Analysis, Advice, 
and Congressional Leadership: The Physician Payment Review Commission and the Politics of 
Medicare, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 113, 114, 137 (1993). 
 22. Iglehart, supra note 4, at 1924; see Oliver, supra note 21, at 127, 137–38, 150. 
 23. See Oliver, supra note 21, at 125; Iglehart, supra note 4, at 1925. 
 24. Oliver, supra note 21, at 125. 
 25. MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 8, at 87. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 88. 
 30. MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 8, at 89; Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 
1985 (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. § 6102 (2000). 
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the lowest in the program’s history.31 In the five years after Medicare’s fee 
schedule and expenditure targets went into effect, Part B spending rose at an 
average annual rate of just 4.4% (less than half the rate from the five-year period 
before the change).32 Moreover, from 1992 to 2002, payment rates for primary 
care services increased by forty percent relative to payment rates for all 
services.33 This financial redistribution in favor of primary care physicians did 
not last, however, as specialty societies eventually reasserted their superior 
influence in both fee schedule recalculations and the adding of new procedure 
codes.34  
II.  FROM THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE TO ANNUAL “DOC FIXES” AND 
MACRA 2015 
In the 1997 Balanced Budget Act, Congress altered the calculation of 
Medicare’s VPS by tying the program’s spending-per-beneficiary on physician 
services to the rate of growth in the national economy, as measured by the gross 
domestic product.35 This total expenditure limitation of the VPS was renamed 
the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR).36 The SGR was initially popular among 
physicians due to the fact that it resulted in annual payment updates that 
exceeded medical inflation.37 
The SGR’s popularity did not last long, though. The recession in 2001, 
coupled with formula recalculations based on new data that had become 
available, led to an unprecedented 4.9% reduction in physician payments in 2002 
(despite physicians’ office expenses increasing that year by 2.6%).38 The 
physician community was shocked; some doctors threatened to stop seeing 
Medicare patients.39 When total Medicare expenditures for physician services 
 
 31. MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 8, at 89. 
 32. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-751T, MEDICARE PHYSICIAN PAYMENTS: 
INFORMATION ON SPENDING TRENDS AND TARGETS 5 (2004). 
 33. Paul B. Ginsburg, Payment and the Future of Primary Care, 138 ANNALS OF INTERNAL 
MED. 233, 233 (2003). 
 34. See MIRIAM J. LAUGESEN, FIXING MEDICAL PRICES: HOW PHYSICIANS ARE PAID 35–36, 
181–83 (2016). 
 35. PAUL SHEKELLE ET AL., S. CAL.−RAND EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE CTR., TECHNICAL 
REVIEW: DETERMINANTS OF INCREASES IN MEDICARE EXPENDITURES FOR PHYSICIANS’ 
SERVICES 1 (2003). 
 36. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-85, MEDICARE PHYSICIAN PAYMENTS: 
CONCERNS ABOUT SPENDING TARGET SYSTEM PROMPT INTEREST IN CONSIDERING REFORMS 8 
(2004). 
 37. Iglehart, supra note 4, at 1926. 
 38. Id.; Paul B. Ginsburg, Rapidly Evolving Physician-Payment Policy — More Than the SGR, 
364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 172, 172 (2011). 
 39. Barbara Martinez, Some Doctors Say They May Stop Seeing Medicare Patients After Cuts, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2002), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1011045837267109120 (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2018). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
240 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 11:235 
surpassed the target again the following year (and every year thereafter), the 
SGR formula generated another proposed cut of approximately 4.7% in 
Medicare fees for physicians for 2003. Rather than allow this to happen, 
Congress intervened and raised fees by 1.4% instead.40 From 2003 to 2015, 
Congress enacted seventeen similar ‘doc fixes’—some years had multiple 
temporary SGR overrides—to prevent annual fee cuts from occurring.41 These 
‘doc fixes,’ together with annual increases in the overall volume of patient care, 
resulted in total Medicare physician expenditures continuing to increase faster 
than the rate of either inflation or economic growth (see Figure 1).42 
Repeated Congressional interventions from 2003 to 2015 to block any 
reduction in Medicare’s physician fee updates compounded long-term budgetary 
problems.43 These repeated ‘doc fixes’ fed back into the SGR formula, resulting 
in larger projected cuts in future years.44 As a result, financial pressure continued 
to build year after year. By 2011, the SGR’s formula was calling for a 24.9% 
reduction in Medicare’s physician fees.45 The cost of terminating the SGR 
altogether—by paying for the accumulated fee reduction projections—had risen 
to approximately $300 billion.46 As Gail Wilensky notes, “this game of ‘kick the 




 40. JIM HAHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE (SGR) AND 
MEDICARE PHYSICIAN PAYMENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2014), http://www.ncsl. 
org/documents/statefed/health/SGRfaqs3212014.pdf. 
 41. See Robert Steinbrook, The Repeal of Medicare’s Sustainable Growth Rate for Physician 
Payment, 313 JAMA 2025, 2025 (2015). 
 42. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, A DATA BOOK: HEALTH CARE SPENDING 
AND THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 90 (2016). 
 43. Peter W. Carmel, AMA: A New Opportunity to Fix the SGR, KEVINMD (Sep. 15, 2011), 
https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2011/09/ama-opportunity-fix-sgr.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). 
 44. Id. 
 45. 2011 MPFS Final Rule Reduces Pay Rates, AAPC (Nov. 12, 2010), https://www.aapc. 
com/blog/9110-2011-mpfs-final-rule-cuts-pay-rates/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). 
 46. Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 172–73. 
 47. Gail R. Wilensky, Developing a Viable Alternative to Medicare’s Physician Payment 
Strategy, 33 HEALTH AFF. 153, 154 (2014). 
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Figure 1. Yearly Medicare Spending Compared to MEI and Fee Increases48 
Besides being a blunt approach to trying to restrain total cost growth, the 
SGR also created unintentional and “perverse incentives for individual 
physicians to increase” the volume of care they provided.49 These perverse 
incentives made the system more unfair. In other words, the SGR’s formula-
driven, mandated fee cuts (which Congress simply postponed) were to be 
applied evenly to all physicians even though certain physicians in some 
specialties in a few states contributed disproportionately to the excessive 
Medicare expenditures.50 For example, compared to physicians in Vermont, 
Maine, and North Dakota, physicians in New York, Florida, and Texas overshot 
their per capita SGR targets by eighty percent between 2003 and 2009.51 During 
this same period, cardiologists as a group overshot their SGR target by seventy-
nine percent compared to general surgeons who undershot their estimated target 
by 106%.52 
Finally, in 2015, the SGR’s growing unpopularity with physicians, 
Democrats, and Republicans intersected serendipitously with two events, the 
first of which was a surprise. The annual rate of overall health care cost growth 
slowed considerably following the passage of both the Patient Protection and 
 
 48. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, A DATA BOOK: HEALTH CARE SPENDING 
AND THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 89 (2016). 
 49. See Robert A. Berenson, Interactions Between the SGR and RBRVS: Making Sense of 
Alphabet Soup, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Feb. 13, 2008), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2008/02/13/in 
teractions-between-the-sgr-and-rbrvs-making-sense-of-alphabet-soup/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). 
 50. See Ali Alhassani et al., Perspective, The Sources of the SGR “Hole”, 366 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 289, 289 (2012). 
 51. Id. at 290–91. 
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Affordable Care Act in 2010 and the Budget Act of 2011, the latter of which 
included sequestration (an automatic, across-the-board two percent reduction in 
Medicare payments to medical providers).53 These developments led to the 
Congressional Budget Office dramatically reducing the estimated budgetary 
cost of terminating the SGR from roughly $300 billion to around $136 billion.54 
Second, funding for the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), which 
provides subsidies to cover children in low-income families who are not poor 
enough to qualify for Medicaid, was set to expire in 2015.55 As a result, in a rare 
display of bipartisanship, Congress voted overwhelmingly—392 to 37 in the 
House and 92 to 8 in the Senate—to scrap the SGR, to extend CHIP funding for 
two years, and to transition to a new physician payment system with the 
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) on April 
14, 2015.56  
III.  MACRA BASICS AND PHYSICIANS’ OPTIONS 
MACRA made a number of major changes to physician reimbursement. 
First, it locked in provider payment rates at near zero growth until next year 
(2019).57 Second, most health care professionals who see Medicare patients are 
expected to participate in one of two separate Quality Payment Programs 
(QPPs): Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) or advanced Alternative 
Payment Models (APMs).58 Both programs strive to reward health care 
professionals who provide high quality, efficient care instead of a higher 
quantity of services. MIPS streamlines the Physician Quality Reporting Program 
(PQRS), Value-Based Payment Modifier (VM), and Medicare Electronic Health 
Records (EHR) Incentive Program into a single composite score based on 
 
 53. STACEY MCMORROW & JOHN HOLAHAN, URBAN INST., THE WIDESPREAD SLOWDOWN 
IN HEALTH SPENDING GROWTH: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE SPENDING PROJECTIONS AND THE 
COST OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 6 (2016), https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/ 
issue_briefs/2016/rwjf429930. 
 54. Henry J. Aaron, Three Cheers for Logrolling — The Demise of the SGR, 372 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1977, 1977 (2015). 
 55. Elisabeth Wright Burak, Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015: 
Summary of Key Provisions Impacting Children, GEO. HEALTH POL’Y INST. CTR. FOR CHILDREN 
& FAM. 1 (2015), https://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/MACRA-Kids-Brief-
October-update.pdf; Anthony T. Lo Sasso & Thomas C. Buchmueller, The Effect of the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program on Health Insurance Coverage, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 1059, 
1059 (2004). 
 56. Gail Wilensky, The “Doc Fix” is Over, but Unresolved Concerns Linger, 313 JAMA 
2211, 2211–12 (2015). 
 57. Id. at 2212. 
 58. Peggy Eastman, CMS Proposes Rule on Implementing Quality Payment Program Under 
MACRA, ONCOLOGY TIMES, Aug. 2017, at 24, 24. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2018] MACRA AND MEDICARE’S ELUSIVE QUEST FOR FAIRNESS 243 
Quality (fifty percent), Clinical Practice Improvement Activities (fifteen 
percent), and Advancing Care Information (twenty-five percent).59 
The other option for physicians who receive a significant share of their 
revenue or patient counts from Medicare is to join an advanced Alternative 
Payment Model (APM).60 Advanced APMs differ from other APMs by allowing 
providers to earn more by taking on some of the financial risk related to patient 
care.61 Specifically:  
[a]n APM will qualify as an advanced APM in 2019 and 2020 if the APM entity 
is (1) at risk of losing 8 percent of its own revenues when Medicare expenditures 
are higher than expected, or (2) at risk of repaying CMS up to 3 percent of total 
Medicare expenditures, whichever is lower.62 CMS states that it plans to 
increase the risk standard to 10 or 15 percent of revenues in future years.63  
APM participants will be exempt from MIPS and qualify for incentive payments 
from 2019 to 2024.64 Participation in the advanced APM path will lead to a five 
percent incentive payment in 2019.65 Advanced APMs require physicians to use 
certified EHR technology, use quality measures like those in MIPS, and bear 
more than a “nominal” amount of risk for monetary losses.66 Possible models of 
eligible advanced APMs include Medicare Shared Savings Programs, Next 
Generation ACO Models, Oncology Care Model Two-Sided Risk 
Arrangements, and Comprehensive End-Stage Renal Disease Care Models.67 
Small physician practices face a threat from MACRA.68 Unless major 
changes are made to MACRA’s structure or implementation, many physicians—
seeking to avoid the onerous administrative requirements and financial risk of 
MIPS—will eventually be confronted with having to join either a medical home 
demonstration project, a large single-specialty practice, or a big accountable care 
 
 59. Wilensky, supra note 55, at 2212; Jeffrey D. Clough & Mark McClellan, Implementing 
MACRA: Implications for Physicians and for Physician Leadership, 315 JAMA 2397, 2398 (2016). 
 60. Peter S. Hussey et al., The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act: Effects on 
Medicare Payment Policy and Spending, 36 HEALTH AFF. 697, 698 (2017). 
 61. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., APMs Overview, QUALITY PAYMENT 
PROGRAM, https://qpp.cms.gov/apms/overview (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 62. Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) Quality Payment Program 
Final Rule, AM. MED. ASS’N 4 (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media 
-browser/public/physicians/macra/macra-qpp-summary.pdf. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Clough & McClellan, supra note 58, at 2397; Hussey et al., supra note 59, at 698–99. 
 65. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 60. 
 66. See MACRA: Disrupting the Health Care System at Every Level, DELOITTE, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/life-sciences-and-health-care/articles/macra.html (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
 67. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 60. 
 68. Rick Mayes, MACRA, Physicians, & “Big Med”, VIEWPOINTS: HEALTH POL’Y BLOG 
UVA PUB. HEALTH SCI., https://med.virginia.edu/phs/2018/01/19/mayes-macra-physicians-
bigmed/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2018). 
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organization (ACO) that assumes significant two-sided or “downside risk” of 
financial losses on patient care.69 The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 
which Congress relies upon for independent analysis and advice on Medicare 
payment policy, wrote in August of 2017 that sensible, good-faith 
implementation modifications to MIPS to make it more flexible have also made 
it more complex and likely to “promote only silos of care, not the totality and 
coordination of patient care.”70 Further, the integrity of measuring the quality 
and costs of individual physicians under MACRA has been called into question 
given that the patient care provided by 234,000 nurse practitioners (NPs) was 
connected to physicians due to NPs’ use of “incident to billing” for 
reimbursement from Medicare.71 How will the NP’s care affect physicians’ 
quality scores? Given these and other concerns, Congress should seriously 
consider repealing MIPS. 
With the increased administrative costs and financial risk associated with 
participating in MIPS, hospitals and other large health care delivery systems will 
probably come to be seen by many physicians as safe ports in the financial storm 
caused by MACRA.72 Estimates from the RAND Corporation are that “MACRA 
will decrease Medicare spending on physician services –$35 to –$106 billion (–
2.3 percent to –7.1 percent) and change spending on hospital services by $32 to 
–$250 billion (0.7 percent to –5.1 percent) in 2015-30.”73 The rate of Medicare 
spending growth on physician care will slow at the same time that the majority 
of hospitals have been losing money treating Medicare patients (with their 
overall financial solvency saved by higher payments from private patients).74 
Moreover, while the explanation of MACRA’s details in this paper may seem 
complex, they are a very simplified version of the 823-page MACRA final 
rule.75 “Faced with MACRA’s complexity and the financial risk it introduces,” 
 
 69. Clough & McClellan, supra note 58, at 2398. 
 70. Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, Comments on Proposed Rule, Medicare & 
Medicaid Services Medicare Program: CY 2018 Updates to the Quality Payment Program, CMS-
5522-P 5 (Aug. 18, 2017), http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/comment-letters/081820 
17_cms5522p_qualitypaymentprogram_comment_v3_sec.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
 71. Peter Buerhaus et al., The Integrity of MACRA May Be Undermined by “Incident to 
Billing” Coding, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/h 
blog20180103.135358/full/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
 72. 5in5: Hospitals Can Be MACRA Mediators, OPTUM, https://www.optum.com/resources/ 
library/manage-MACRA-through-hospital-physician-partnerships.html#main-content (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2018). 
 73. Hussey et al., supra note 59, at 697–703. 
 74. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE 
PAYMENT POLICY 84–85 (2017). 
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observes Larry Casalino, “many physicians are likely to throw up their hands, 
[and] say ‘this is the last straw—I can’t take it anymore.’”76 
IV.  SUMMARY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION: MACRA AND “BIG MED” 
Since the 1980s, Medicare payment policy in general and physician 
reimbursement reforms in particular have preoccupied many elected leaders, 
Medicare officials, private insurance executives, and other health care payors. 
Their primary goals have been increased value for patients and those who pay 
for care, along with expanded control over the rate of total health care cost 
growth.77 As such, MACRA is just the most recent major reform initiative. It 
reflects the inescapable reality that “there are many mechanisms for paying 
physicians; some are good and some are bad,” as James Robinson notes.78 
Robinson explains further: 
The three worst are fee-for-service, capitation, and salary. Fee-for-service 
rewards the provision of inappropriate services, the fraudulent upcoding of visits 
and procedures, and the churning of ‘ping-pong’ referrals among specialists. 
Capitation rewards the denial of appropriate services, the dumping of the 
chronically ill, and a narrow scope of practice that refers out every time-
consuming patient. Salary undermines productivity, condones on-the-job 
leisure, and fosters a bureaucratic mentality in which every procedure is 
someone else’s problem.79 
MACRA, like Medicare Advantage and various physician payment models in 
the private sector, encourages payment innovations that blend the different 
payment approaches to mitigate the undesirable dynamics of pure fee-for-
service, capitation, or salaried physician reimbursement. 
Yet MACRA also amounts to something of a gamble on the ability of big 
health care organizations to improve the quality of patient care and restrain cost 
growth. This gamble reflects a belief among many employers, elected officials, 
and members of the health policy community that (1) pay-for-performance 
schemes for health professionals work80 and that (2) Medicare must shift from a 
volume-to-value reimbursement model that moves away from fee-for-service 
payment.81 Yet the evidence for this belief is “thin, mixed, and preliminary.”82 
Consistently and accurately measuring quality in health care and then paying for 
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it appropriately has proven to be exceedingly difficult in the United States.83 
Changing physician behavior, as Gail Wilensky has shown, is almost always 
harder than policy makers assume.84 Health care spending varies more across 
individual physicians than across hospitals,85 as some physicians in various 
forms of practice organization respond better to rules, others to incentives.86 
Meanwhile, the physician community generally resents what it perceives as 
non-clinician micromanagement of their behavior.87 Until the past two years, the 
majority of physicians chose to not even submit various quality (Physician 
Quality Reporting System, or PQRS) data to Medicare and simply accepted a 
one to two percent penalty in their reimbursement fees due to the expense and 
onerous work involved in submitting the data.88 Physicians already report 
greater stress and frustration over caring for their patients while spending more 
time dealing with external quality measures.89 Their frustrations are only likely 
to increase with MACRA’s acceleration of the corporate transformation of 
American medicine.90 In addition, if this “once-in-a-generation transformation 
from a fee-for-service system to alternative payment models” occurs, some 
specialists stand to lose income and power to primary care physicians.91 The 
kinds of shared savings programs that are most likely to qualify as advanced 
APMS under MACRA aim to reward the chronic disease management and 
prevention activities of primary care physicians and to reduce the use of 
imagining services, diagnostic tests, and physician procedures that are the basis 
of specialist reimbursement.92 
Ultimately, policy makers’ leap of faith with MACRA may turn out to fit 
with what Miriam Laugesen has found to be the “long-standing pattern in U.S. 
health policy: overconfidence in the level of policy disruption occurring and, 
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relatedly, underestimation of the potential for strategic adaptation by 
providers.”93 Most payors see no alternative, however, given that health care 
now accounts for eighteen percent of GDP and continues to squeeze out 
spending on other priorities.94 A critical question, argues Robert Berenson, is 
whether physician leaders will be able to actively guide the evolution of large 
health systems, including APMs, “to increase quality, reduce costs, and reaffirm 
a (perhaps updated) form of professionalism or, alternatively, passively accept a 
transformation in the body and soul of American medicine.”95  
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